- SUCCESSION, devolution of the deceased person's property on his legal heirs. -Order of Succession The Pentateuchal source of the order of succession is "If a man die and have no son, then ye shall cause his inheritance to pass unto his daughter. And if he have no daughter, then ye shall give his inheritance unto his brethren. And if he have no brethren, then ye shall give his inheritance unto his father's brethren. And if his father have no brethren, then ye shall give his inheritance unto his kinsman that is next to him of his family and he shall possess it. And it shall be unto the children of Israel a statute of judgment, as the Lord commanded Moses" (Num. 27:8–11). Scripture makes no mention of the father inheriting from his son but this is laid down in the Mishnah: "The father has precedence over all his offspring" (BB 8:2). An interpretation that son and daughter inherit like shares in their father's estate – and that Scripture merely indicates that daughters inherit all of the estate in the absence of sons – was raised and rejected in the Talmud (BB 110a–b) and it was confirmed that the daughter only inherits if there is no son (see below). A daughter succeeding to her father's estate was enjoined to marry "only into the family of the tribe of their father… So shall no inheritance of the children of Israel remove from tribe to tribe; for the children of Israel shall cleave everyone to the inheritance of the tribe of his fathers" (Num. 36:6–7; cf. also Philo, Spec. 2:126). In the Book of Tobit (6:10–11) two additional elements were attached to the above law: firstly, the enjoinder that the daughter marry "someone from a clan of her father's tribe" was interpreted as a duty imposed not only on a daughter upon her father's death, but also on the father – if he had no sons – to marry his daughter to one of his kinsmen; secondly, the father's violation of the enjoinder was treated as punishable by death, "according to the law of the Book of Moses" (ibid., 6:13). The sages of the Talmud laid down that the duty of the daughter to marry as above mentioned was applicable only to the particular generation to whom the enjoinder was directed (BB 120a and Rashbam ad loc.). Jewish law has the parentelic system of succession, conferring the right of inheritance on all the kin of the deceased in the agnate (paternal) line of descendancy and ascendancy. Precedence among the heirs is determined, firstly, according to the degree of kinship with the deceased: the first parentela includes the deceased's children and their descendants, to the end of the line; the second includes the deceased's father and his descendants; the third, the father's father and his descendants; and so on in an ascending order – "that the estate may ultimately find its way to Reuben (the eldest son of the Patriarch Jacob)" (BB 8:2; TB, BB 115a–b). The nearer parentela takes precedence over and excludes more distant ones from the inheritance: "the lineal descendants of any one with a priority to succession take precedence" (BB 8:2). The mother's family is not regarded as kin for the purposes of inheritance and therefore she does not inherit from her sons nor do her brothers or other relatives. Sons do, however, succeed to their mother's estate (BB 8:1). In post-talmudic times the mother too was recognized as a legal heir in a number of takkanot (see Gulak, Yesodei, 3 (1922), 94). Relatives of the deceased, even if born out of wedlock or of an invalid marriage, are his kin and legal heirs for all purposes as if born of a valid marriage, except for the offspring of a bondswoman or a non-Jewess, who take the status of their mother and are not numbered among the father's family (Yev. 2:5; Sh. Ar., ḤM 276:6). -"Inheritance in the Grave" (Yerushah ba-Kever) According to this principle, the place of a son who predeceases his father is taken by his children in inheriting the portion which he, but for his death, would have inherited (BB 115a; Yad, Naḥalot, 1:3, 5). If the deceased's sole survivors should be a daughter and a son's daughter, the latter will inherit the whole estate since she takes the place of her father to the exclusion of his sister; the Sadducees, however, held the opinion that in such event the inheritance is shared between the deceased's daughter and his granddaughter (BB 115–116a). A son who predeceases his mother "does not inherit from his mother to transmit the (inheritance) to (his) brothers on his father's side" (BB 114b). -Primogeniture The firstborn son of the father takes a double portion in his estate: "… he shall acknowledge the firstborn,… by giving him a double portion of all that he hath; for he is the firstfruits of his strength; the right of the firstborn is his" (Deut. 21:16–17). The firstborn is entitled to the double portion even if he is a mamzer . On the other hand, the law of the firstborn does not apply to daughters who inherit in the absence of sons (Sif. Deut. 215). The firstborn only takes a double portion from the estate of his father and not from that of his mother or any other relative (Yad, Naḥalot, 2:8). If the firstborn predeceases his father, the double share which he would otherwise have inherited from his father's estate is taken by his heirs (Sh. Ar., ḤM 277:15). If the firstborn is born after his father's death (or in the case of twins) he does not receive a double portion (BB 142b). The inheritance due to the firstborn equals the portions of two ordinary heirs. Thus if the deceased is survived by five sons including the firstborn, the latter takes a third, i.e., two-sixths of the estate, and the other four heirs take one-sixth each; if there are nine sons, the firstborn takes a fifth and each of the others takes one-tenth (Yad, Naḥalot, 2:1). The portion of the birthright is fixed according to the state of the inheritance at the time of its devolution. Hence it is neither diminished by the birth of another son after the father's death, nor is it increased by the subsequent death of a son (BB 142b). The firstborn only receives a double portion out of the muḥzakim, i.e., estate assets already held by the deceased in his possession at the time of his death. With regard to re'uyim, i.e., assets contingent to come to the deceased but not held by him at the time of his death, the firstborn takes only the share of an ordinary heir. Hence the firstborn does not take a double portion of an inheritance that accrues to his father after the latter's death, nor of the unrecovered debts owing by others to the latter – whether verbal or witnessed by deed. The firstborn does, however, take a double portion of all such outstanding debts owing to his father as were secured by pledges held by the latter in his possession at the time of his death (Bek. 8:9; Sh. Ar., ḤM 278:7). Just as he takes a double portion, so the firstborn is obliged to defray a double portion of the outstanding debts owed by his deceased father (BB 124a). -The Husband as Heir to His Wife The husband is heir to his wife and takes precedence over all her other heirs. Opinions are divided in the codes as to whether the husband's right to succeed to his wife's estate stems from the Pentateuchal or the rabbinical law (Yad, Naḥalot 1:8; Sh. Ar., EH 90:1 and Beit Shemu'el thereto, n. 1). The husband is heir to his wife even if their marriage was a prohibited one – as for example between a priest and a divorcee (Yad, Naḥalot 1:8) – provided only that they were still married to each other at the time of her death (Tur, EH 90). It does not matter that the husband was planning to divorce his wife, but if he had claimed that his marriage was based on a mistake, for example if he had raised a plea of blemish or defect on the part of his wife, he forfeits his right of inheritance (Teshuvot Maimoniyyot, Ishut, no. 35). In explaining this halakhah the aḥaronim expressed the opinion that although mere admission by the husband concerning his wife's defect does not suffice to dissolve their marriage, yet for the purposes of inheritance the husband's admission is like the testimony of 100 witnesses and therefore upon the death of the wife her husband will not be regarded as one who is heir to his wife's estate (Ḥelkat Meḥokek, EH 90, n. 15). According to some scholars, even a mored (see husband and wife ) or a husband who has refused to cohabit with his wife due to his vow, forfeits his right to inherit her estate (Rema, EH 90:5). The husband only inherits the part of his wife's estate in her possession at the time of her death and he does not take her place in inheriting her contingent inheritance (Sh. Ar., EH 90:1). If she became entitled to an inheritance during her lifetime but she died before gaining possession thereof, the inheritance will nevertheless be deemed to have been held by her and it will pass to her husband (Maharashdam, resp. EH no. 98). The husband's right to inherit his wife's estate proved to be to the detriment of the wife's relatives and heirs since they received nothing at all from her estate. Various takkanot accordingly came to be made, aimed at defining the inheritance rights of the wife's heirs and limiting those of her husband. The first of these, dating from the mishnaic period, is known as the ketubbat benin dikhrin (i.e., ketubbah of male children). In terms thereof the husband inherited his wife's estate, but if the wife predeceased her husband leaving sons from the latter, these sons would upon their father's death inherit her ketubbah and dowry in addition to their portions in the estate of their father shared with his other sons. The object of the takkanah was "in order that all men might thereby be encouraged to give to a daughter as much as to a son" (Ket. 52b; Sh. Ar., EH 111), i.e., so that the father should not hesitate to give his daughter a large dowry since it would remain in the hands of his descendants and not with his daughter's husband. In geonic times the need for this takkanah fell away and it was abolished, since it had anyhow become customary for fathers to give more to their daughters (Tur, EH 111). Later many of the posekim sought to revive the validity of this takkanah but its abrogation was confirmed by Isserles (Rema, EH 111: 16). In the period of the rishonim various takkanot were made to limit the husband's right to inherit his wife's estate. In some communities, if the wife died without issue, it became customary for the whole of the dowry given to her upon marriage to be inherited by her father or his heirs, and in other communities for the dowry to be divided between the husband and the wife's heirs on the paternal side (Sh. Ar., EH 118:19; Teshuvot Maimoniyyot, Ishut no. 35). In France and Germany one of the ordinances known as the takkanat shum (שו״ם – Speyer, Worms, Mainz) came to be widely accepted. The effect thereof was to oblige the husband to return whatever remained of his wife's dowry – save for deduction of burial expenses – to the donor thereof or to her heirs, if she died childless within a year of her marriage; the second part of the ordinance laid down that upon the death of either husband or wife within the second year of their marriage, half of the dowry was to be returned to the heirs of the deceased if there were no surviving children (Rema, EH 52:4). In Spain similar takkanot were made. The most important of these, the takkanah of Toledo, laid down that if the wife was survived by her husband and any children of their marriage, her estate was to be shared equally between them; if there were no surviving children, her estate was to be divided between her husband and those who would have succeeded to her estate had she survived her husband. The object of the takkanah was to prevent the entire inheritance of the wife's family from going to her husband, and in this manner the scholars restricted the husband's rights as legal heir to his wife – in the opinion of some of the posekim even in accordance with the Pentateuchal law (see above) – and afforded him only one-half of her estate (Rosh, resp. 55:1,6; Rema, EH 118:8). -The Wife's Rights to Her Husband's Estate The wife is not a legal heir to her husband's estate (BB 8:1) but has a number of rights which afford her a share therein and ensure provision for her sustenance and essential needs until her death or remarriage. The widow receives from the estate her husband's ketubbah obligations, the dowry increment , and her own property brought into the marriage and she is further entitled to maintenance from the husband's estate until her death or remarriage. Important changes were introduced by the takkanot of Toledo and Molina with regard to the widow's rights to the estate of her deceased husband. These had the object of strengthening the hand of the husband's heirs against the widow's claims upon the estate, and laid down that if the husband was survived by any children the wife might claim no more than one-half of the total value of the estate toward payment of her dowry, ketubbah, and its increment. Thus the husband's heirs were afforded the option of settling the widow's claims in full – as was usually done when the total amount thereof did not exceed one-half of the estate – or settling her claims by paying her one-half of the value of the estate, even if less than due to her. If there were no children and the widow's claims were directed against the other heirs to her husband's estate, the latter would first return to her whatever remained – in specie, at the time of her husband's death – of the dowry she had brought him, and from the remainder of the estate she would recover her ketubbah and its increment in an amount not exceeding one-half of the value of the estate, the option as above mentioned again residing with the heirs (Rosh, resp. 50:9; Sh. Ar., EH 118:1; Beit Shemu'el ad loc. no. 1). In a takkanah of Castile it was laid down that a wife surviving her husband, without any children of their marriage, might take from the estate everything proved to have been brought by her as a dowry and remaining in specie at the time of her husband's death, and from the rest of the estate one-quarter, with three-quarters going to the husband's heirs (Rashba, resp., vol. 3, no. 432). -Inheritance Rights of Daughters Since by law sons exclude daughters as heirs (see above), it became necessary to make provision for the support of daughters after the father's death. This was achieved by the scholars through an obligation imposed on the heirs of the deceased to maintain his daughters and by way of giving daughters part of the estate as a dowry. MAINTENANCE OF DAUGHTERS The rule is: "If a man died and left sons and daughters, and the property was great, the sons inherit and the daughters receive maintenance; but if the property was small, the daughters receive maintenance and the sons go a-begging" (Ket. 4:6; 13:3; 9:1). By mishnaic times this obligation had become part of the generally accepted law as a tenai bet din (i.e., a takkanah of the early scholars). Daughters are entitled to maintenance out of the estate of their deceased father until they reach the age of majority, or become betrothed (Ket. 4:11; 53b). Since the daughter's right to maintenance, as distinct from her right to a dowry, stems from the ketubbah deed (of her parents), any testamentary instruction of the deceased in deprivation of this right will have no legal validity (Ket. 68b; Sh. Ar., EH 112:10). Daughters only receive maintenance out of the estate of their deceased father if he is survived by sons as well; if the father is survived by daughters only, the latter share his estate – even though any of them be minors – and the question of their maintenance is no longer relevant (Sh. Ar., EH 112:18). DOWRY Sons are obliged to give their deceased father's daughters part of his estate as a dowry, as if the father were alive. This obligation is known as issur nekhasim (i.e., giving the daughter one-tenth of the estate), in terms whereof an assessment is made of what the father would have given his daughter as a dowry – according to his disposition, gathered from his friends and acquaintances, his transactions and standing – and if this cannot be established by the court, she is given one-tenth of the estate as the parnasat ha-bat (i.e., dowry; Sh. Ar., EH 113:1, based on Ket. 68a). According to some scholars, a daughter is also entitled to receive a dowry out of her deceased mother's estate (EH 113:1), but this is disputed by other scholars (Rema, EH 113:1). The father may deprive his daughter of a dowry by testamentary instruction since the parnasat ha-bat is merely an assessment of the father's disposition (Ket. 68b). Although the daughter's dowry is recoverable at the time of her marriage, the court may earlier decide on what she should be given upon her marriage (Beit Yosef and Darkhei Moshe, EH 113). The dowry is regarded as a charge in favor of the daughter on the estate of her father, as at the time of his death, and she may seize from third parties any of the estate assets sold or mortgaged by her brothers. However, debts incurred by the deceased himself, as well as the obligations for the ketubbah of his widow and maintenance for the latter and her daughters, take preference over the daughters' dowry (Ket. 69a; Sh. Ar., EH 113: 5, 6). See also parent and child . -Shetar Ḥaẓi Zakhar In post-talmudic times it became customary in the Ashkenazi communities for a father to allot to his daughter one-half of a son's share in his estate, for which purpose there was evolved a special deed known as the shetar ḥaẓi zakhar ("deed for half of the male child's share"). The deed was written by the father – and sometimes by the mother too (Naḥalot Shivah, no. 21, n. 1) – in favor of the daughter or her husband. It was generally written at the time of the daughter's marriage, the father undertaking to pay his daughter a specified sum of money, generally a very high amount, to fall due for payment one hour before his death, with a condition exempting his sons from liability for such debt after his death if they should give the daughter one-half of a son's share in his estate (Rema, ḤM 281:7). This development was an important step toward the regulation of the daughters' right of inheritance in Jewish law (for further details see Assaf, bibl.). -Proselytes as Heirs A proselyte is regarded as a newborn person whose ties of kinship with his family have been severed for inheritance purposes. The scholars ruled, however, that a proselyte may accept an inheritance from his gentile father, lest the loss thereof tempt him to return to his former ways. A proselyte's estate is inherited by sons born after his conversion to the exclusion of his other sons, whether or not proselytized along with himself (Kid. 17b; BB 142a). The estate of a proselyte who dies without any legal heirs may be acquired in the same way as abandoned property, by the firstcomer, who is regarded as an heir for the purposes of estate liabilities in favor of third parties (Rema, ḤM 275:28). -Devolution of Inheritance and Renunciation Upon death the estate passes automatically and immediately into the ownership of the heirs. Hence an heir cannot renounce his share by waiver thereof, since in Jewish law a person cannot waive something that already belongs to him but only that which is yet to come to him, and the heir can only transfer his share in the same way as any other property is transferred through one of the recognized modes for its assignment or alienation (see acquisition , Modes of). An exception to this rule is the birthright portion of the firstborn (see above), as distinguished from his ordinary share (Tur, ḤM 278; Sh. Ar.; ḤM 278:10). An heir may, however, abandon his share in the same way as he abandons any of his own property (Sma, ḤM 278, no. 27) and a husband's renunciation of his right to his wife's estate is valid if made prior to their marriage, but not thereafter (Ket. 9:1, 83a). -Debts of the Deceased It is a mitzvah for the heirs of the deceased to pay his debts. They will be compelled to do so if they inherit land and, according to a takkanah of the geonim, the creditor may recover from the heirs even when they inherit movable property. If they inherit both, the heirs prevail if they want payment to be made out of the land rather than the movable property as desired by the creditor (Sh. Ar., ḤM 107:1). For the purposes of her dowry (see above) a daughter takes only from the land left by the deceased, a rule that survived the above-mentioned takkanah of the geonim (Sh. Ar., EH 113:2). Payment is always recovered from the poorest quality land (i.e., ẓibburit, Sh. Ar., ḤM 108:18). A stipulation by the creditor to recover payment out of the debtor's best (iddit) or medium (beinonit) land is not binding on the latter's heirs unless this was expressly provided for in the stipulation (ibid.; see also execution ). If the heirs of the deceased inherit nothing from him, they will not be obliged – not even morally – to defray his debts, since they do not have to do so out of their own property (Sh. Ar., ḤM 107:17). An heir is not heard if he should plead, "I do not take nor will I pay" (Rema, ḤM 107:1; and Sh. Ar., ḤM 278:10). The heirs are liable for debts of the deceased to the extent that these do not exceed the value of the assets held by the deceased at the time of devolution of the inheritance, his contingent assets (re'uyim) being excluded for this purpose (Rema, ḤM 104:16). However, a debt due to the deceased is considered part of the assets held by him at the time of his death. Some scholars have explained this special rule on the basis of the extensive development that took place with regard to credit transactions, with creditors coming to rely upon such as upon movable property rather than as contingent assets (Rosh, resp. 36:3), and other scholars have regarded loans due to the deceased as property held by him upon death since the money of the loan had previously been in his possession (Beit Shemu'el, EH 100, no. 3). The creditor recovers his debt from each of the heirs on a pro-rata basis (Tos. to BB 107a S.V. u-va ba'al ḥov). A field hypothecated (see lien ) by the deceased is recovered by the mortgagee from the heir who receives it as part of his share, and he may recoup from the remaining heirs (Sh. Ar., ḤM 175:4). Similarly, if a creditor should experience difficulty when seeking to recover a proportionate share of the debt from each of the heirs, he may recover the whole debt out of the share of any one of them, and that one may recoup from the others (Rosh, resp. 79:7). A verbal debt (see obligations , Law of) is not recoverable from the heirs of the debtor except in the following cases: the debtor had before his death and from his sickbed admitted such indebtedness; the loan was for a fixed period and not yet due for payment; or the debtor had refused to make payment notwithstanding a judgment of the court, maintaining his refusal until death. In each of these three cases the creditor recovers without swearing an oath (Sh. Ar., ḤM 108:11). A debt witnessed by deed is only recoverable after the creditor has sworn that the debt is still outstanding (Sh. At., ḤM 108:17). If the heir should plead that he was left no property by the deceased and the creditor plead with certainty that the deceased did leave property, the heir will be exempted from liability upon taking the equitable oath (shevu'at hesset; Sh. Ar., ḤM 107:2). A creditor holding a bond of indebtedness with a credency (ne'emanut) clause in his favor (see shetar ) will not be exempted from delivering an oath when seeking to recover from the debtor's heirs unless he was so exempted expressly with reference to the debtor and his heirs (Sh. Ar., ḤM 71:14–17). In case of a similar clause in favor of the debtor with regard to a plea of payment of the bond, the creditor will not be entitled to recover from the former's heirs on such bond (Sh. Ar., ḤM 71:21). Debts of the deceased are not recoverable from his heirs as long as they are minors regardless of any clause whatever stipulated in the bond of indebtedness, lest contradictory evidence come to light (ibid., 108:3). However, in the three events mentioned above in which a verbal debt of the deceased is recoverable from his heirs, his debts will be recoverable from the minor orphans too (ibid.). The court has the discretion to allow debts to be recovered from the minor orphans if this be to their advantage, e.g., because the creditor is prepared to waive part of the debt in return for recovering the balance forthwith (Rema, ḤM 110:1), and the minor heirs may also be recovered from when they are liable to a penalty for nonpayment on due date (Siftei Kohen, ḤM 110, no. 3). If some of the heirs are majors the creditor recovers from them pro-rata to their share in the estate. For the purpose of division of the estate the court will appoint a guardian for the minor (Sh. Ar., ḤM 110:1). -Commorientes Where two persons die at or about the same time and it is unknown who died first, the rights of their heirs are determined in accordance with the following order of priority: If one of the claimants is a "certain" heir – i.e., whatever the sequence of the deaths – and the other a "doubtful" heir – i.e., only upon a particular sequence of death – the former claimant excludes the latter and takes all (Rashbam, BB 158b); if both claimants are doubtful heirs they take equal shares of the inheritance (Yev. 38a; Yad, Naḥalot 5:5); if one of the claimants is kin to the deceased himself and the other has become entitled through the death of a relative who is kin to the deceased, the former claimant takes all in both cases (Yad, Naḥalot 5:6), for the reason that the inheritance is not to be diverted from the kin of the deceased unless this is warranted by proof of a particular sequence of deaths (see M. Silberg, Ha-Ma'amad ha-Ishi be-Yisrael (1965), 314–22). On the inheritance of public offices, see mishpat ivri ; public authority ; on the inheritance rights of apostates, see apostasy (Family Law). -In the State of Israel Matters of inheritance are governed by the Succession Law, 5725 – 1965, the provisions whereof accord with Jewish law in a number of respects and digress therefrom in others. Thus, as in Jewish law, the law lays down, inter alia, that children born out of wedlock and even mamzerim are included among the heirs (sec. 3 (c). The Jewish law principles with reference to commorientes (see above) were adopted virtually without change. On the other hand the law differs from the traditional approach in laying down that the line of succession ends with the grandparents and their descendants, whereafter the state succeeds, and that both husband and wife are in the line of succession to each other. So too the law recognizes no distinction between sons and daughters, between the paternal and maternal lines (sec. 10), nor does it mention the double portion of the firstborn. (On the question of the absorption of Jewish law in these matters, see Elon, bibl.). An important principle incorporated in the law is that of the widow's right to maintenance out of the estate; unlike Jewish law, this right is extended to other relatives of the deceased besides the widow and daughter, and is also wider in scope (secs. 57, 58). See also apotropos ; wills . (Shmuel Shilo) -In the Regulations of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel In 1943 the first steps were taken to promulgate regulations by the Chief Rabbinate to provide for equal distribution of a decedent's estate between sons and daughters, and between husband and wife. The Mandatory Succession Ordinance of 1923 provided that, where a person died intestate, and owned land classified as miri at the time of his death, the provisions of the Ordinance – mandating an equal distribution to sons and daughters, to the man and the woman – were binding upon the religious courts as well. The Israeli rabbinical courts complied with this Ordinance, but it was difficult to anchor this custom in the rule of dina de'malkhuta dina (see dina de-malkhuta dina ), insofar the majority of halakhic decisors ruled that dina de-malkhuta dina does not apply to matters of inheritance. Thus, the rabbinical courts adopted an approach whereby the equal distribution was carried out on the basis of the agreement of both parties, entered into with a kinyan, to distribute the estate in a manner differing from the manner prescribed by Torah. (The rabbinical courts act in this fashion today as well, unless the parties have agreed that the rabbinical court adjudicate according to the rules set forth in Torah, pursuant to Section 155 of the Succession Law.) In 1943, regulations were enacted setting forth the procedural rules in the rabbinic courts. Sections 182 and 183 of the regulations provide that, regarding miri land – the rabbinic court is to rule pursuant to the Succession Ordinance. Thus, the rabbinical courts accepted the regulations set forth in the Succession ordinance regarding certain portions of the inheritance as binding upon the parties by force of the Chief Rabbinate's regulations, and not only by force of rabbinical acquiescence de facto to an arrangement based on an authority external to the rabbinical court. However, the incorporation provisions of the Succession ordinance should not be understood as a halakhic-normative provision that henceforth, Jewish Law mandates equal rights in the distribution of an estate between the sons and the daughters, and husbands and wives – i.e. as a substantive change in the laws of succession in Jewish law. An attempt to make that substantive change in Jewish Law was made by Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog in the years preceding the establishment of the State of Israel, and in the first years thereafter. Rabbi Herzog proposed that the Chief Rabbinate, together with the other prominent rabbis of that generation, should enact regulations regarding inheritance to provide for equal distribution of the inheritance between sons and daughters. His suggestion was that, at the time of the parents' marriage, a condition should be written in the ketubbah stating that the distribution of the "estate" (and not "the inheritance") be carried out in such a manner that the daughter would "receive" (and not "inherit") an equal share with the son, so long as she is unmarried, rather than only a tenth of the assets. Rabbi Herzog assumed that, if such regulations were enacted, the rabbinic courts would be conferred jurisdiction to adjudicate matters of inheritance, whereas without such regulations – and insofar as the rabbinic courts would rule according to the Shulḥan Arukh – the Knesset would revoke the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts over this issue and possibly over other issues relating to personal status. Rabbi Herzog hoped that, after promulgating these enactments, it would be possible to introduce a legislative proposal before the Knesset for the enactment of a Succession Law based on Jewish law. Beyond these considerations, Rabbi Herzog believed that such enactments were necessary as a substantive matter as well, just as he believed that enactments (takkanot) should be promulgated in many other areas. In view of the changes that had occurred in society over the course of time, as a result of which women were insisting upon their rights and demanding equality, it was the duty of the rabbinate to make efforts to find a solution that would address the feelings of women that they were discriminated against by Jewish Law. Rabbi Herzog proposed the promulgation of similar enactments regarding the inheritance of the eldest son and the inheritance by the husband of his wife's holdings. It should be emphasized that his proposals were based on halakhically acceptable measures and earlier regulations that had been promulgated in these matters. Like Rabbi Herzog, Rabbi Ben Zion Meir Ḥai Ouziel, his Sephardi counterpart in the Chief Rabbinate, believed that equal distribution of the parents' property among sons and daughters could be provided for at the time of the marriage of the parents, through a will. Rabbi Herzog's proposals for rabbinical enactments were not accepted by the other members of the Chief Rabbinate Council, and the proposed enactments never proceeded beyond the "proposal" stage. -Regulations Promulgated by the Moroccan Sages in the Mid-Twentieth Century In the 1950s, proposals were raised before the Rabbinical Council of Morocco, regarding the promulgation of regulations to equate the status of daughters and sons. The reasons invoked by the Moroccan sages to justify such regulations were the changes that had occurred over time in the general outlook and in the situation, status and role of women, which was equal to that of men in the workplace and in terms of earning a livelihood. The regulatory proposal included a grant of equality to married women as well as unmarried women, representing a novel approach in comparison to the regulations that had been promulgated throughout the ages in this regard. These proposals were never promulgated as regulations, because shortly after this proposal was raised, Morocco gained political independence and the rabbinic courts' jurisdiction over questions of personal status was revoked. Nevertheless, these proposals of the Moroccan Rabbinical Council are instructive regarding the approach of the North African sages to the promulgation of regulations in our time, as opposed to the stricter approach, limiting halakhic creativity, adopted by the Ashkenazi sages since the time of the Emancipation in Europe (see takkanot ). (Menachem Elon (2nd ed.) -BIBLIOGRAPHY: I.M. Hazan, Successione per Israele (1851); H.B. Fassel, Das mosaisch-rabbinische Civilrecht, 1 (1852), 274–320; A. Wolff, Das juedische Erbrecht (1888); M. Bloch, Das mosaischtalmudische Erbrecht (1890); I.S. Zuri, Mishpat ha-Talmud, 3 (1921), 1–24; Gulak, Yesodei, 3 (1922), 71–112; Ch. Tchernowitz, in: Jewish Studies… I. Abrahams (1927), 402–15; S. Assaf, in: Emet le-Ya'akov, Sefer Yovel… J. Freimann (1937), 8–13 (Heb. section); Ch. Cohen, in: Yavneh, 3 (1948/49), 80–83; J.D. Cohen, in: Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, 2 (1949/50), 18–24; B.M.H. Ouziel, ibid., 9–17; ET, 2 (1949), 16–20; 5 (1953), 152–6; 6 (1954), 279–82; 9 (1959), 536–42; A. Karlin, in: Ha-Peraklit, 9 (1952/53), 22–26; J. Hakohen, in: Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, 5–6 (1952/54), 177–90; B.M.H. Ouziel, in: Talpioth, 5 (1952), 451–74; 6 (1953), 51–64; J. Herzog, ibid., 6 (1953), 36–50; A. Karlin, Divrei Mishpat, 1 (1954) (Dinei Yerushot ve-Ẓavva'ot); S.D. Revital, in: Sugyot Nivharot be-Mishpat (1958), 442–69; E.J. Waldenburg, in: Sefer Yovel le-Shimon Federbusch (1960), 221–6; Elon, Mafte'ah, 92–104; E.E. Ur-bach, in: Divrei ha-Congress ha-Olami ha-Revi'i le-Madda'ei ha-Yahadut, 1 (1967), 133–41; Engl. summary: ibid., 263 (Eng. section); B. Schereschewsky, Dinei Mishpahah (19672), 224–70; M. Elon, in: ILR, 4 (1969), 126–40. ADD. BIBLIOGRAPHY: M. Elon, Ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri (1988), 1:135, 474f, 670ff., 679ff.; 3:1337f., 1362, 1389, 1413ff. and index; idem, Jewish Law (1994), 1:152; 2:578, 828f., 837ff.; 3:1596f., 1625, 1656, 1683ff.; idem, Ma'amad ha-Ishah (2005), 255–96; idem, Ḥakikah Datit (1968), 42–43; idem, "Yiḥuda shel Halakhah ve-Ḥevrah be-Yahadut Ẓefon Afrikah mi-le-aḥar Gerush Sefarad ve-ad Yameinu," in: M. Bar Yuda (ed.), Halakhah u-Petiḥut Ḥakhmei Moroko ke-Posekim le-Doreinu (1985), 29ff.; M. Elon and B. Lifshitz, Mafte'aḥ ha-She'elot ve-ha-Teshuvot shel Ḥakhmei Sefarad u-Ẓefon Afrikah (legal digest) (1986), 169–73; B. Lifshitz and E. Shochetman, Mafte'aḥ ha-She'elot veha-Teshuvot shel Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz, Ẓarefat ve-Italyah (legal digest) (1997), 110–15; Y. Cohen, "The Inheritance of a Wife of her Husband in the Communal Enactments," in: Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, 6–7 (1979–1980), 133–75 (Heb.); I. Gruenfeld, The Jewish Law of Inheritance (1987); Y. Herzog, in: I. Warhaftig (ed.), Teḥukah le-Yisrael al-pi ha-Torah, 2 (1989); Y. Rivlin, Ha-Yerushah ve-ha-Ẓavva'ah ba-Mishpat ha-Ivri (1999); E. Shochetman, "The Halakhah 's Recognition of the Laws of the State of Israel," in: Shenaton ha-Misphat ha-Ivri, 16–17 (1991), 417 (Heb.); Z. Weinman, "Law of Inheritance in the Rabbinical Courts – Applied Halakhah," in: Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, 8 (1981), 490ff. (Heb.).
Encyclopedia Judaica. 1971.